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houghts seem to be about something – they seem to 
have meaning.  This  property has been called 
―intentionality‖.  A theory of intentionality must ex-
plain how and why our thoughts have such content.  A 
naturalized theory of intentionality hopes to explain the 
content of mental states within accepted scientific framework.  
Such a theory of mental content hopes to explain the meanings of 
mental states in non-intentional terms, avoiding words such as 
believes or desires. 
 
Teleosemantics 
 The focus in this paper will be one type of naturalized 
theories:  teleosemantic theories of mental content.   Three types 
of teleosemantic theories of content appear in the literature; I call 
them the ‗High Level‘,1 ‗Low Level‘, and ‗All-Inclusive‘ theories,2  
named for how they make content ascriptions.  In the scope of 
this paper, I will examine just one of those teleosemantic theo-
ries:  the ‗Low Level‘ theory forwarded by Karen Neander.    
T 
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Teleosemantic theories of mental content introduce the idea of 
biological proper function in order to pinpoint mental content.3  
Biological functions are behaviors of traits in the ancestors of an 
organism that have led to the organism‘s survival.  For example, 
possible function ascriptions for the heart could be circulating 
blood, creating rhythmic patterns of beating, or having four 
chambers.  Historically, it was the property of circulating blood 
which led to the survival of those organisms that contained 
hearts.  If the heart circulated blood, but did not beat rhythmi-
cally or have four chambers, the heart would still have been se-
lected for in the organisms containing them.  Thus, the biological 
proper function of the heart is pumping blood.  Similarly, par-
ticular mental states have been selected for and we can move to 
pinpoint the precise reason. Hence, we can examine biological 
function when determining mental states‘ content.  
 If a state in a representational system is functioning 
properly, then the content of that intentional state is what is sup-
posed to be represented.  And the function of any trait, including 
mental states, is determined by natural selection.  The story 
about content in teleosemantics goes something like this: (i) A 
token of a mental state is normally caused by an environmental 
stimulus.  (ii) The mental state acquires its content by allowing 
the system to achieve normal functioning.  (iii) Evolution deter-
mines the normal functional states of the system; hence we are 
able to determine the content of mental states by reference to se-
lection history.4  For example, a frog will snap at flies or BB gun 
pellets when they pass in front of his visual field, but because 
flies served as frog food in the selective history, the proper con-
tent ascription for the frog in the presence of either a fly or a BB 
gun pellet will be (on one interpretation) the mental state with 
content ‗fly‘.  From this point on, I will use small caps—like 
FLY—to indicate the content of a mental state. 
Frogs have become a popular example in discussing 
teleosemantic theories, so for the majority of this paper I will use 
the example to discuss relevant issues.  Simple organisms seem 
to be the appropriate place to start when considering teleose-
mantic theories.  In the same way that natural selection begins 
with simpler systems and has them adapt and become more 
complex, mental states must at some point in selective history 
have had much less sophisticated content and became more like 
beliefs and other complex states as selective forces took their 
course.  If we begin to pinpoint determinate content in less so-
phisticated organisms, the more sophisticated contents will be 
much easier to examine. 
 
The Indeterminacy Problem 
With appeal to natural selection, we are able to limit the 
possibilities for mental content to those predicates which are 
causally relevant to selection.  But many of these descriptions 
will co-vary in an organism‘s natural environment.  Fodor points 
out that, if the object of intentionality can reliably be picked out 
by different predicates in an organism‘s environment, then any 
of the descriptions are functionally equivalent as the organism‘s 
mental content.5  In the frog‘s environment, small, dark, moving 
objects are reliably flies which are reliably frog food.  It appears 
that we may be left with multiple predicates that are causally re-
lated to the trait‘s function.  By considering selective history 
alone, we cannot pinpoint the best or most appropriate content 
from among the possible relevant descriptions.  Ultimately, the 
story for teleosemantic mental content can be told in many 
ways—thanks to co-variation, a frog receives the same selective 
advantage by sticking his tongue out at either  FOOD, FLY, or 
SMALL, DARK, MOVING OBJECT (there are teleosemantic theories 
that argue for each).  As Fodor puts it: ―Darwin cares how many 
flies you eat, but not what description you eat them under.‖6   
Thus, we have the indeterminacy problem for teleose-
mantics: many possible mental contents are extensionally equiva-
lent, meaning that coextensive contents can be substituted for 
each other without changing the success of the organism using 
them.  Selection history may be able to pinpoint only one object 
towards which the mental state should be directed, but multiple 
functional descriptions of that object exist.  With reference to se-
lection history alone, teleosemantic theories cannot know which 
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of the descriptions will lead the system to proper functioning, 
and this creates indeterminacy of content.7 
In this paper, I will first discuss how a ‗Low Level‘ con-
tent ascription solves the indeterminacy problem.  I will then 
present a specific objection to the Low Level theory: that it does 
not generalize to more sophisticated mental states.  And in the 
final section, I will defend the theory against the objection and 
put forward a sketch of how to extend the Low Level teleose-
mantic theory. 
 
II. The Low Level Theory 
 
 In this section, I will present a sketch of Neander‘s ‗Low 
Level‘ teleosemantic theory of intentionality and explain how the 
theory solves the Indeterminacy Problem.   
Functional Decomposition 
 Neander borrows Robert Cummins notion of functional 
analysis in her Low Level teleosemantic theory.8  In a functional 
analysis, we first must decompose an organism or system into its 
component devices and subsystems, each with a function that 
contributes to the overall functioning of the system.  Addition-
ally, each subsystem can be assigned multiple functions.  If a trait 
T has a function F, then it will also have a function G if it is able 
to G, in part, because it has the function of F-ing.  This can also 
be stated with ‗by‘ relations.  We could say T has function G by 
also having function F.  In this way, we can decompose the func-
tion of a trait down to less and less sophisticated functional com-
ponents.  The decomposition seems to continue down to the sub-
nuclear level. However, the level of description relevant to the 
selection history of mental states will ‗bottom out‘ at a certain 
level, namely, where the representational system is still unana-
lyzed, and any description below that will be a story about im-
plementation.9 For instance, a frog‘s tongue snapping can be ac-
counted for by neural firings or chemical reactions; however, 
such explanations are not representational and thus, they cannot 
help us to understand mental content. 
Neander gives the example of an antelope with an adap-
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tation that leads to an altered hemoglobin structure.10  The ante-
lope will have a greater level of fitness by avoiding predators that 
hunt on the flat land by being able to live at a higher altitude by 
increasing oxygen intake in the blood by having the altered he-
moglobin structure.  Each of the predicates linked with a ‗by‘ re-
lation is a function of the antelope‘s hemoglobin structure, but 
the trait itself is the most immediate explanation of the further 
effects.  It seems clear then that the levels of description in the 
functional decomposition are not co-extensive. Escaping preda-
tors is not only accomplished by living at higher altitudes; living 
at higher altitudes is not only accomplished by having a greater 
oxygen intake, etc.   
 Looking at the highest level of function is often indeter-
minate, because there is conceivably more than one way of 
‗climbing the ladder‘ to achieve the higher levels of function.  In 
the case of the antelope, we can think of many ways of increasing 
fitness—an increased lung capacity, for instance, could result in 
the same selective advantage given by the altered hemoglobin 
structure.  Since there is ultimately more than one possible way 
to achieve some evolutionary results, the higher levels of func-
tion depend on the presence of the lower levels.  Thus, the lowest 
level of description that still contributes to the system‘s function-
ing is the most immediate in explaining the presence of the 
higher levels: it is the most determinate explanation.11   
Representational Content 
 In Neander‘s account, biological traits factor a great deal 
into the content of representations.  Organisms have evolved 
with traits that have proper functions which were adaptive for 
their survival.  Systems have evolved with certain physical ca-
pacities and properties, and science studies these systems and 
how they respond to stimuli in their environment.  Since science 
may describe the content of a representation or the function of a 
trait in multiple ways for any representation or trait in question, 
we must determine which of the biological devices and which 
description of content is most immediate to how the representa-
tional system is able to achieve proper functioning.12 
 Neander claims that, at least in the case of a frog, the 
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proper content ascription is at the level where the frog‘s detec-
tion device is unanalyzed in the decomposition.13 When consid-
ering the frog‘s representational system, the lowest unanalyzed 
component of the functional analysis will be the detection de-
vice.14  The content of a representation is focused on the stimulus-
form that has been used by the biological devices.  Note that we 
are not concerned with neurophysiological behavior; we are not 
concerned with how the representation is created or information 
is processed, because only the features of the representation con-
tribute to proper functioning.  By focusing on the function of the 
representation we can pinpoint the lowest level in the functional 
decomposition as the most accurate description of what the bio-
logical device is doing.  In frog-like systems, detection of proper-
ties of the perceptual stimulus provides content to the mental 
state. 
A frog tokens SMALL, DARK, MOVING OBJECT in the pres-
ence of flies or BBs moving across his visual field.15  In the envi-
ronment where tongue snapping behaviors evolved, the small, 
dark, moving spots were reliably flies, and flies are good frog 
food.  The frog displays biologically proper behavior by snap-
ping at small, dark, moving objects.  Higher-level descriptions 
like FOOD or FLY are not the content. The frog snaps at any appro-
priately small, dark, and moving stimulus—this leads the frog to 
snap at flies and BB gun pellets.  It would be beneficial for the 
frog to be able to detect nutritious objects or even to recognize 
flies or other prey-species, but neither capability is part of the 
naturally selected traits of the frog.  The current representational 
powers of the frog adequately approximate the appropriate nu-
tritious or prey-like properties by detecting small, dark, moving 
objects.16  Also, it is worth noting that SMALL, DARK, MOVING OB-
JECT is not referring to the image on the visual system, but to the 
features of the flies and BB gun pellets that the frog responds to 
in the environment.  By appealing to the most immediate, lowest
-level description of representational content, we will point to 
predicates that are causally relevant to the mental state‘s selec-
tion and are able to eliminate indeterminacy. That, in essence, is 




 Neander‘s Low Level teleosemantic theory brings about 
three main objections: (i) Low Level theories do not pay enough 
attention to the needs of the system; (ii) ascribing low-level men-
tal content does not allow adequate room for misrepresentation; 
and (iii) Neander‘s Low Level theory will not generalize to ac-
count for more sophisticated mental contents.  For the remainder 
of this paper, I will focus primarily on this third objection, be-
cause it seems to arise as a result of the first two. 
Fails to Generalize 
 Neander concedes that her theory may have difficulty 
when applied to human mental states for two main reasons: (i) 
we can misrepresent without malfunction and (ii) the content of 
mental states contains more information than features in the en-
vironment.17  Misrepresentation is unmistakably possible when 
one considers belief-desire contents. Based on our intuition, a 
frog is snapping at a fly because he wants to eat it.  We know that 
a small, dark, moving object may not always be something a frog 
can eat—BBs are small, dark, and moving, but are not edible. But 
the Low Level is willing to say that the frog has not misrepre-
sented when it snaps at a BB.  Misrepresentation in Neander‘s 
theory occurs in those cases where something goes ‗wrong‘.  For 
instance, if the mental state or intentional behavior is not di-
rected at an appropriately shaped target, then the organism has 
misrepresented.  Misrepresentation for the frog is a matter of his 
failing to discern the properties of a stimulus.  Again, the frog 
does not misrepresent if he snaps at a bee-bee but would if he 
snapped at a snail or a shadow moving across his retina.18  If we 
compare frog representations to human representations, a gener-
alized Low Level teleosemantic theory may be missing obvious 
cases of misrepresentation.  Suppose you see a garden hose at 
night and believe that it is a snake because it shares certain 
physical features in common. When you are startled by the 
hose‘s presence, then certainly misrepresentation occurs.  Per-
haps if Neander claims that the frog has not misrepresented, then 
she would also claim that you have not misrepresented when 
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you are startled by the garden hose. 
 Contra Neander and the relevance of the frog example, 
we know that our human representational states are not all a 
matter of detection.  When we discern the visible properties of an 
object in the world, our representational work is not done. We 
must put it to use, and this is where misrepresentation occurs.  
Mohan Matthen has claimed that representations like the frog‘s 
are only quasi-representational states because they do not carry 
the type of information we expect in a representation.19  This 
means that they do not closely resemble the full-blown represen-
tations we are used to employing, though beliefs and desires 
may have evolved from these quasi-representational states.   
Elsewhere, David Papineau claims that there may not 
even be a determinate answer about the content of the frog‘s 
mental state, suggesting that using our understanding of frog 
mental states to understand belief-desire states will be even more 
difficult.20  The failure to generalize may be an objection to teleo-
semantic theories in general, due to their focus on simple repre-
sentational systems.  Because we, as humans, can only be sure 
that systems with belief-desire psychology have determinate 
mental content, we cannot have determinate content in systems 
without beliefs and desires.  Thus, our understanding of simple 
representational states does not help in understanding more so-
phisticated states.  Low Level teleosemantics does not tell us any-
thing about human beliefs and desires. 
 
IV. Extending the Low Level 
 
In this section, bearing in mind those strong complaints, I 
will present a brief sketch for how Neander‘s teleosemantic the-
ory (or perhaps a modified version) can apply to more sophisti-
cated representational systems, such as those with a belief-desire 
psychology.  First, I will dismiss the mistaken intuition that frog-
representations should resemble our belief-desire representa-
tions.  Then, I will introduce a few tools, strategies, and consid-
erations that may help in conceiving of how the story may gener-
alize. 
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Action-Oriented Representation 
 Action-oriented representations21 (also called pushmi-
pullyu representations22) carry information about the world and 
an appropriate course of action.  The representation is immedi-
ately linked to behavior, as opposed to a more intuitive notion of 
representation, where an internal, behavior-guiding representa-
tion (like a desire) is paired with a detecting or indicating repre-
sentation (like a belief) to produce behavior.  An action-oriented 
representation does not require inferences, and the functional 
behavior is immediate to the detection of a stimulus.  These are 
primitive representations, used to reduce the information proc-
essing used in achieving proper function. 
 The frog‘s mental state in the presence of flies seems to be 
one of these pushmi-pullyu representations.  The frog does not 
have to first identify an object in his environment, and then de-
cide whether to snap at it.  The tongue snap immediately results 
from the detection; it is built into the state SMALL, DARK, MOVING 
OBJECT.  Also, the representation is well-defined for the frog.  Be-
cause the representation and subsequent tongue snapping is only 
concerned with the stimulus-form, the gathering behavior will 
occur when the frog detects the proper object.  If a frog snap was 
directed at FOOD, then he ought to not only snap at flies, but also 
at any object that will be nutritious.  A frog does not detect food 
because he does not use that representation to snap at other 
small insects that populate his environment.  Also, FLY does not 
describe the frog‘s mental state, because some flies, e.g. dead 
ones, may not cause tongue snapping.  The frog will only snap 
upon detecting certain properties of the stimulus – namely, that 
it is small, dark, and moving.  Thus the correct content ascription 
is SMALL, DARK, MOVING OBJECT.  The mental state the frog is us-
ing to obtain flies is of this primitive type – it is action-oriented, 
and our intuitions about beliefs and desires do not apply to this 
class of mental states. 
Properties of Action-Independent Representations 
 Opposed to these action-oriented representations, there is 
another class of representations that are action-independent, and 
Teleosemantics and the Believer 27 
beliefs and desires are types of these action-independent mental 
states.  Andy Clark divides in two the cases where a representa-
tion is available in the absence of an environmental stimulus.  
The first, and simpler, case involves ―reasoning about absent, 
nonexistent, or counterfactual states of affairs.‖23   These mental 
states are able to direct behavior in the absence of their object by 
allowing the user to remember past conclusions and predict fu-
ture outcomes.  This means that representations of previously 
detected stimuli can be available to the system independent of 
behavior.  For example, we could token the representation FLY in 
planning a picnic in order to remember to bring bug spray, 
whereas the frog will snap immediately upon tokening SMALL, 
DARK, MOVING OBJECT and is not able to use the representation 
without the presence of a stimulus. 
 The second form of action-independent representations 
are those mental states whose ―physical manifestations are com-
plex and unruly.‖24  These representations point to sets of predi-
cates which are related in a more abstract manner, and many 
times, these representations are concerned with classifying an 
object in a particular way in order to guide behavior toward it.  
These mental states can be available in the absence of environ-
mental stimuli, but the stimuli that they point to are less clearly 
defined.  An example of such a representation would be LARGE, 
and with it we would be able to distinguish between two objects 
that may be very similar, namely by choosing which is larger.  
And we can additionally use the representation LARGE to make 
comparisons between two objects which may be different, if they 
happen to have largeness in common.  Again, action-oriented 
representations do not have this property—the frog cannot 
choose which of the two objects is more  small, dark, and moving; 
he simply snaps in the presence of those features alone. 
 Additionally, it seems that these sorts of sophisticated 
representations can be applied to an indefinite number of situa-
tions.  By possessing a mental state directed towards a concept, 
we must also possess the general knowledge of how and when to 
apply the concept to various objects.  This is the Generality Con-
straint for conceptual representations.25  Our understanding of a 
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concept or a conceptual property seems to imply two abilities.  
For any object R, we can entertain the mental state that R has 
property P, as long as we possess the concept of P.  And addi-
tionally, if we possess the concept of a property P, then we can 
apply P to any object capable of possessing P.  For example, if we 
possess the state CAT, then we can entertain the mental state OLD 
CAT or CIGAR-SMOKING CAT so long as we have the concept OLD 
or CIGAR-SMOKING.  And similarly, if we possess the concept 
VALUABLE, we can entertain the internal state VALUABLE HOUSE or 
VALUABLE TREE, as long as houses or trees can be valuable.  How-
ever, the frog does not possess the concept SMALL or DARK or MOV-
ING—those contents are only properties of the intentional object 
at which he is snapping. 
 If we are to scale the Low Level teleosemantic theory up 
to account for action-independent states, then we must be able to 
tell a story about how these properties of representations will 
arise.  Detection of present environmental features seems to be 
all that is necessary for action-oriented representations. But this 
does not hurt the theory. Think again of the frog. Perhaps it 
would have been able to acquire an independent mental state FLY 
had its environment been filled with BBs.  It would still be de-
tecting small, dark, moving things, but the detection of some ad-
ditional feature would be necessary to ensure fitness, and the 
causal interaction of these two features (assuming that the frog 
has to infer from two distinct detections that his desired snap-
object is present, instead of combining the information into one 
detection that is action-oriented) would lead to a rudimentary 
representation pointing to flies.  Now it seems now that a viable 
possibility for obtaining action-independent representations 
must include the interaction between multiple representations in 
one mental state. 
 
The Representation Toy26 
Here, I will ask you to conceive of a certain type of repre-
sentational system, slightly more complex than the frog‘s, but 
still very simple. I hope to illustrate how ascribing low level con-
tent to a system with multiple representations depends on causal 
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interaction.  For these illustrations, I will use the letter S to repre-
sent stimulus, R for representation, and B to indicate behavior.  
The simplest system will have two detection-type representa-
tions that must combine to guide behavior. Thus, there will be 
four possible behaviors depending on whether either of the two 
representations is tokened.  For any number of representations 
N, they will combine to cause 2N outcomes, some of which may 
be behavioral and others representational: 
 
                         
 
Figure 1: Representation Toy with two representations. 
 
When ascribing the mental content behind any of the behaviors 
involved, we cannot describe the mental state as detecting just 
one of the two features, because this will not account for the 
presence or absence of the other representation.  Instead, content 
must be assigned for any particular behavior according to how 
the two representations, R1 and R2 interact.  If the representa-
tional system is only action-oriented, at the very least we will 
simply have a combination of two detections.  But if our system 
possesses the capability of inference, then it will be able to enter-
tain concepts that rely on the interaction of both detections.  It 
appears, then, that possessing action-independent representa-
tions relies on increasing the causal complexity of the system and 
the number of interactions between representations. 
 Consider yet another scaling up of the system.  In this 
toy, there are again two simple detection representations, R1 and 
R2, which are caused by environmental stimuli S1 and S2.  But 
there is a third representation, R3, which is a directive represen-
tation that will be caused to token by the detection of R1.   The 
presence of this representation will ultimately guide certain be-
 ¬R2 R2 
¬R
1 B1 B2 
R1 B3 B4 
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haviors—in this case either B1 or B2 will occur without the pres-
ence of the detection representation R1: 
 
 
          
  
Figure 2: Representation Toy with one action-independent repre-
sentation. 
 
In this representation toy, the output is not all behavioral.  When 
analyzing the functional behavior, the mental state clearly is not 
a matter of detection alone.  The representational system must 
use an independent behavior-guiding representation caused by a 
prior detection event. This notion is comparable to the detection 
of hunger and the independent desire to eat.  So, when ascribing 
content to the mental state, we must consider a representational 
system which does more than detect. 
 This brings us to how the Low Level teleosemantic theory 
of mental content could assign a meaning to action-independent 
mental states.  Our hope in examining the first representational 
toy was to find a low-level content ascription that will not rely on 
 R1&R2 R1&¬R2 ¬R1&R2 ¬R1&¬R2 
¬R3 R3 R3 B3 B4 
R3 B2 B2 B2 B1  
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detection only.  When analyzing the representational system ca-
pable of inference, the functional decomposition contained more 
than the detection device—which would have been incapable of 
performing inferences on its own.  Now, with this second exam-
ple of a representational toy, we certainly have some action-
independent states as opposed to a system only possessing ac-
tion-oriented states.  When we are examining a representation 
that can be present in a system without a detection event causing 
it, the lowest level in the functional decomposition must exist 
within a system that does more than detect.  The detection device 
alone will not account for our representation‘s content.  If it is to 
successfully guide behavior, the system that this representation 
belongs to must have some conceptual or inferential capabilities.  
While it may not have mental states like ―I believe there is an S2 
nearby…‖ or ―If only I had some S2…,‖ the system at minimum 
must have a conception of the object S2 or representation R2 
(which represents S2) independent of its detection in virtue of 
how R3 is able to direct behavior towards S2 and R2. 
 The properties of action-independent representations dis-
cussed earlier are easily comprehended in our three -
representation toy (the second one); but if we were to imagine 
further scaling-up of the toy, the representations involved would 
become more complex and abstract, because of the increasing 
number of interactions.  As the complexity continues to increase, 
our system would have to be able to compare representations 
that are seemingly unrelated. Yet, even once we have these com-
plicated types of action-independent representation available, it 
still seems that our low-level content would conform to the gen-
erality constraint.  Our three-representation toy does not have 
adequate conceptual content to use its representation R3 in any 
other capacity than directing his behavior towards the object S2. 
But nonetheless, the frog can apply a property like ―R3 satisfier‖ 
to any object that causes R2—namely, S2-type objects.  And as 
we continue to scale up, there will be multiple non-detection, ac-
tion-independent representations available to the system which 
get their content by virtue of how they are related to the other 
behaviors and representations of the system.  Thus, the toy will 
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be able to apply those representations as properties of the vari-
ous objects and concepts towards which those representations 




 Now that our representational system can have action-
independent representations with content ascribed by the Low 
Level teleosemantic theory, we can see why the frog‘s misrepre-
sentation occurred.  In addition, we still retain the case of a mal-
functioning neural apparatus causing misrepresentation—for 
example, if our three-representation toy was to token the state R2 
when no S2-type object was present.  But with the mental state 
R3, it is clear that mistakes in reasoning about representations 
can occur—these are cases of what I will call ―inferential misrep-
resentation.‖  First, if R2 was mistakenly tokened, as above, then 
the inferential system will of course make the mistake of guiding 
behavior towards objects which will not satisfy R3.  This is the 
easy type of inferential misrepresentation, similar to mistaking a 
garden hose for a snake, where snake-directed behavior would 
most likely be misguided.  The correct inference will be made by 
the representational system, but the mistake will have occurred 
in detecting the information used in the inferential process.  Ad-
ditionally, the possession of these behavior-guiding representa-
tions could cause a different type of inferential misrepresenta-
tion.  The representation toy might use R3 to cause R2-directed 
behavior without the presence of either R2 in the system or S2 in 
the environment.  This would be comparable to going to the re-
frigerator to get a glass of milk when you do not believe that 
milk is in the refrigerator. R3 will direct itself towards R2 in R2‘s 
absence, without the other representations it relies on to enact 
mistake-free behavior.  Thus, low-level mental content ascrip-
tions are still compatible with misrepresentation as a mental 
state‘s causal complexity is increased.   
In the case of the frog, we had to find the function of the 
detection device to determine content, but with action-
independent states, we must give preference to the lowest level 
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where the representational system as a whole is functionally 
complete.  The most immediate effect of a mental state on a rep-
resentational system will include all of its interactions—
including possible interactions with the other states of the sys-
tem.  Of course, I have not explained the story entirely.  It re-
mains to be seen how we determine a complete description of 
what the most immediate effect on the system is.  Choosing ex-
actly which devices contribute to the representational system in 
our analysis may also be difficult.  The important fact for Low 
Level teleosemantic theories is that it seems that such a story can 
possibly be told.  And the appeal of low-level ascriptions of con-
tent remains by picking out the meaning of a mental state in the 
least sophisticated manner, despite the increasing complexity of 
the story told. 
In this paper, I set out to examine the Low Level teleose-
mantic theory of intentionality.  First, I presented the basic the-
ory, and an objection to the project – Fodor‘s indeterminacy 
problem.  I then presented Neander‘s Low Level solution to the 
indeterminacy problem. I offered a close look at one objection 
against the Low Level teleosemantic theory: that the theory fails 
to generalize to more sophisticated, action-independent repre-
sentations.  I reframed the frog‘s mental state as an action-
oriented representation, showing that the frog‘s mental state in 
the presence of flies was really a matter of detection, in order to 
dismiss mistaken intuitions about the Low Level content.  Fi-
nally, I presented some concerns and considerations regarding 
scaling up the Low Level theory to account for human represen-
tation.  Ultimately, I‘ve concluded that the Low Level teleose-
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